As China becomes an increasingly powerful international actor, holding an informed understanding of its regional and global intentions grows in importance. This is especially the case at a time when public discourse on the meaning of China's rapid rise can fall anywhere between painting China as a state hell-bent on world domination to one of China as a benevolent hegemon. What, then, are the principles guiding Chinese grand strategy in the first half of the 21st century? Perhaps the best place to start is to investigate whether China has a grand strategy, because the presence of grand strategy offers a framework through which to understand how a country behaves in the international system.
While the term grand strategy is often invoked it is rarely, if at all, clearly defined. This post defines grand strategy as a set of ideas about a state’s objectives in the international system, and how a state should go about achieving them. A grand strategy therefore determines what a state’s ultimate goals and interests are; the most pressing threats to those goals and interests; the ways in which a state’s resources can be utilised to deal with crises and opportunities; and the initiatives (economic, diplomatic, and military) through which a state interacts with other entities.
I will proceed in three parts, the first of which will discuss the core interests China seeks to pursue and the threats it faces as its policymakers navigate a complex international environment.
Interests
The first question that must be asked is what are the goals and interests of China? These are the state’s highest political ends and priorities. They are articulated by officials occupying the highest levels of leadership. Any state will have many varied interests and objectives, but a grand strategy articulates exactly what sits at the top of the hierarchy of goals that leaders seek to achieve in formulating a foreign policy.
China’s leadership expresses explicit goals for the state and does so with clearly-defined time frames. The Constitution of the Communist Party of China states that the beginning of the 21st century marks for China an entry into a “new stage of development" involving the building of a "moderately prosperous” society. In this new stage, strategic objectives of economic and social development are set to “bring China into a moderately prosperous society” by the time of the Party's centenary celebration in 2021, bring per capita GDP “up to the level of moderately developed countries”, and “realize modernization” by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China in 2049. The most definitive statement on China's strategic ambition is “to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country by making economic development the central task”. Effectively, all other work undertaken by Chinese leadership is to be subordinated to attain these goals of economic development.
China’s goals and interests are further elaborated by China’s articulation of its ‘core interests’. China surmises its core interests as development, security, and sovereignty as defined in China’s 2011 Peaceful Development White Paper. It ought to be apparent that the overarching objectives are to keep the party in power, promote the rejuvenation of China through economic development, and to achieve the twin goals of becoming a ‘moderately prosperous society’ by 2021 and achieving ‘modernisation’ by 2049. This would return China to what it perceives is its rightful position as the leading Asian power following a century of humiliation, and these goals are encapsulated in Xi Jinping’s concept of the ‘Chinese Dream’.
Threats
What do China’s top leaders see as the primary threats to China’s core interests? Documents and speeches by key foreign policy figures suggest that the United States (US) and its alliance system pose the most pressing threat to China. This is not to say that Chinese leaders openly state that the US is its primary threat because for China to achieve its goals and protect its core interests, a constructive relationship with the US and its allies is important. Yet China is nonetheless suspicious of US intentions towards it.
Firstly, there is a valid perception in China that the US seeks to undermine the rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC) due to an ideological hostility towards socialism and authoritarianism. Furthermore, China has equally valid reasons to believe that the US seeks to maintain its economic hegemony in East Asia. It therefore sees the US and its alliance partners as wanting to contain China in a manner similar to US containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This fear is exacerbated because allies of the US are neighbours of China who are fearful of how a more powerful China will behave towards them. As such, China repeatedly warns against power politics and Cold War thinking.
China seeks to assuage fears held by the US and its allies in the region over the possibility that a more powerful China would grow assertive and eventually seek hegemony for itself. Dai Bingguo, a senior diplomat, has addressed this most directly by stating that “we do not seek hegemony” and “will never compete with other countries for leadership in our region.” At the same time, China seeks to warn the US and its allies against attempting to contain China in an effort to preserve US hegemony. China’s Peaceful Development White Paper states that countries “should abandon the Cold War mentality and confrontation between different alliances”. Dai Bingguo has also said: “We hope that what other countries do in Asia is not aimed to keep off, contain or harm China,” and has gone further to openly criticise the US for selling weapons to Taiwan “in disregard of China's firm opposition.”
A second threat perceived by China’s leadership is any kind of disruption to vital supplies necessary for sustainable economic development. While China has been self-sufficient for most of its history, this changed in the 1990s and it is now dependent on foreign imports of resources vital to its economic growth. Today, China is the world’s largest energy consumer as its oil self-sufficiency ended in 1993, and it became a net coal importer in 2009. Around 90 percent of its oil imports reach China via tankers passing from the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea via the Strait of Malacca, which is a classic maritime chokepoint susceptible to a blockade. Former General Secretary of the CPC, Hu Jintao, called this threat to China’s supply chains as its ‘Malacca Dilemma’. China is concerned about any potential disruption caused by non-state actors such as terrorists and pirates. At the same time, Hu also linked this concern to the perceived threat of the US when he indirectly alluded to US attempts to “control navigation through the strait.” These statements have been central in arguing that China must remain vigilant against foreign attempts to exploit this vulnerability.
Summary
As China has become richer and more powerful, its foreign policy orientation has evolved from the approach of Deng Xiaoping to keep a low profile and bide its time. Today, China is demonstrating greater willingness to use its power and enhanced capabilities to influence and shape its external environment. China is clear about its core interests and goals: the CPC remaining in power; ensuring economic and social development to achieve the twin centenary goals; achieving reunification with Taiwan; and defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity. China sees the US and its alliance system and dependence on foreign resources as the biggest threats to these goals and interests.
Taken together, the interests and fears of China are not enough to demarcate a consistent overarching grand strategy. In order to gain a more complete picture of what any such strategy for China might be, the next instalment will address the second half of our grand strategy calculations by focusing on the ways in which China harnesses its resources to deal with crises and opportunities, and the initiatives (economic, diplomatic, and military) through which it interacts with other entities.