China's Grand Strategy in the First Half of the 21st Century
Part Three: Structures and Personalities
As China becomes an increasingly powerful international actor, holding an informed understanding of its regional and global intentions grows in importance. This is especially the case at a time when public discourse on the meaning of China's rapid rise can fall anywhere between painting China as a state hell-bent on world domination to one of China as a benevolent hegemon. What, then, are the principles guiding Chinese grand strategy in the first half of the 21st century?
A previous post explored the policies and initiatives (diplomatic, economic, military) that China has developed in order to achieve its goals, protect its core interests, and counter perceived threats. In this post we conclude our discussion of China's grand strategy for the first half of the twentieth century by bringing together an image of China's interests, threats, policies, and initiatives as a comprehensive grand strategy.
This final instalment will surmise our discussions from previous instalments and outline a clear and concise overview of China's grand strategy based on the definitions outlined in part one. It will then go on to briefly touch on other contributing factors to grand strategy which are beyond structural imperatives, and what a rising China might mean for the international system.
Making Sense of Things
Drawing conclusions from our previous discussions, it is clear that China has a coherent grand strategy supported by strategic guidelines as articulated by officials occupying the highest leadership positions within the Communist Party of China. Furthermore, China's actions in the international arena are aimed at defending core interests and achieving important long-term goals.
China is forthright about its core interests and goals: the CPC must remain in power; economic and social development must be ensured in order to achieve the centenary goals of a developed and modern Chinese nation; reunification with Taiwan must be realised; and state sovereignty and territorial integrity must be maintained and defended at all costs. China perceives that the two problems of the United States and its alliance system together with an over-dependence on foreign resources (particularly energy) are the most pressing threats standing in the way of achieving their goals and interests.
China is also showing an incresing willingness to utilize its levers of power with enhanced capabilities in order to influence and shape its external environment. It is pursuing to complete a wide-ranging military modernisation program with a particular emphasis in developing their information, cyber and naval capabilities as a means of enforcing its security interests. These initiatives have also broadened the choice of options available to Chinese policymakers as they act to strengthen China's maritime territorial claims.
At the same time, this newfound power has had to be used sparingly as China has a clear interest in maintaining a stable peripheral environment conducive to its development. As China greatly benefits from international trade, it has much to lose if long-standing trade relations break down. This is especially the case for those trade relations fundamental to continued development which are conducted via, or in some way reliant upon, strategically critical maritime straits such as the Strait of Malacca. This means that China must act carefully on the international stage, and that it is expected to continue to refrain from policies which could escalate into a military conflict.
Such a national disposition has fostered a highly active diplomatic force in China, working to assuage fears and reassure neighbours that a more powerful China will be a reliable and benevolent power. Similarly, China has used its tremendous economic growth in tandem with opportunities in trade and investment as a means of attracting partners and winning influence with its neighbours. The gravity of China's economic rise means that China is increasingly able to drive home the point to others that infringing on China’s interests will mean missing out on the numerous benefits it provides. This has been most evident across the Belt and Road initiative, which has a strategic element pursuant to domestic growth and alternative energy routes that bypass threats posed by rivals in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea.
Beyond Structural Imperatives
While these structural forces are central in defining and carrying out a coherent grand strategy, they are never representative of the whole story. Grand strategies are not chiselled in stone, they evolve over time. As China has grown in wealth and power, its grand strategy has shifted from one of keeping a low profile and hiding its capabilities under Deng Xiaoping, to one that is more assertive and confident on the international stage under Xi Jinping.
For China, change may come as a response to reactions of other states, shifts in the balance of power, leadership transitions or instability abroad, and by the personal belief systems of individual leaders. Past generations of Chinese leaders have all made their own unique contributions to China’s strategic direction. With Xi Jinping still in the early stages of his leadership, we should expect changes in how he chooses to shape Chinese policy. And because Xi's grip on power does not appear to be diminishing in the near-term, broadening our understanding of Xi's personal beliefs could go a long way.
Operational code analysis is one such useful way we can gain insights into a leader's belief systems and their interpretations of the international system within which they steer their polity. An operation code analysis of Xi Jinping concludes that Xi is first and foremost a status quo leader who is optimistic about the existing international system. At the same time, Xi demonstrates a willingness to drift from the status quo and adopt an assertive foreign policy to achieve his strategic goals if pressure from other powers in the international system grow too great.
Taking together the structural imperatives of the Chinese state with the personal beliefs of Xi Jinping leads to the conclusion that competition between China and the alliance structure of the United States will only increase. Given that a central tenet of United States' foreign policy is the prevention of any one power from attaining regional dominance, and given that China is quickly surging to a dominant position in Asia, the outlook for peace and stability seems lower by the day. With the United States already bolstering its alliance structure as a bulwark against China (an adversary of the United States as outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy) by including India in the QUAD dialogue, and with increasingly high-level discussions between US and Taiwanese officials, there seems little doubt that significant pushback to Chinese grand strategy is already taking place.
The astronomical rise of China signals that the unipolar moment for the United States appears to fading as the international system today appears to be in flux. The danger today is that we may end up sleepwalking into another Cold War. A rising China is perceived as a national security threat by the United States, and China is increasingly willing to flex its might in its region. With such overlapping interests, increased competition is inevitable. But to what end?
While Chinese grand strategy doesn't appear to signal any craving for global domination as some commentators like to point out, there nonetheless remains an irreconcilable dilemma between the policies of China and the United States in the Asia region broadly, and in the South China Sea more specifically. Given that Xi would likely be willing to adopt a more assertive stance if external pressure grows, there may be a need for US officials to review and revise any policy that seeks a containment similar in kind to the one achieved against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. If both countries continue on their respective paths, there is little doubt that it will lead to an even fiercer competition, with a real possibility of igniting a security dilemma in the Indo-Pacific region.
I’d like to apologise for the delay in getting this to your inbox and I hope discussions from previous instalments were still somewhat fresh on your mind as you read this. Thank you for taking the time to read this series. If you are interested in the topic and wonder how might a direct confrontation between the US and China be avoided, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who has had extensive experience in dealing with China, wrote an insightful piece in Foreign Affairs magazine on the issue that I’d highly recommend as further reading. You can read it here.