Continued: Turkish Ambitions in the Mediterranean Sea
The Military Means to Attain Political Ends
In a previous post I discussed Turkey's increasingly assertive role in the Eastern Mediterranean, and how its actions tie into a broader strategic plan for the Turkish military to secure energy resources from its peripheral seas. With the political declaration of the Blue Homeland doctrine (Navi Matan), Turkey's regional ambitions have been laid bare and, in turn, the conflicting interests of Turkey and its neighbours have been brought to the forefront. But political declarations can only go so far in achieving Turkish aims. To better understand the practicability of the Blue Homeland doctrine, an assessment of Turkish current (and future) naval capabilities could prove insightful.
In this post I will look at recent Turkish naval build up as Turkey seeks to operationalize the aims outlined in the Blue Homeland doctrine. In particular, I will discuss Turkey’s naval build-up program “MILGEM” and how it ties into the Blue Homeland doctrine in order to highlight the growing capabilities of the Turkish Navy in the region. I hope to demonstrate that Turkey's regional ambitions will have the necessary naval capabilities to dominate the three seas in its periphery, inevitably leading to a higher risk of conflict as actors in the Mediterranean compete over natural resources.
Tunisia, (May 17, 2015). Turkish frigate TCG Turgutreis moored in Tunis during Exercise Phoenix Express 2015. The Turkish vessel participated in exercises led by U.S. Africa Command, which were designed to improve regional cooperation, maritime domain awareness, information-sharing practices, as well as to provide training for sea-based anti-piracy operations. Photo by David R. Krigbaum, available here.
The last decade has seen the Turkish navy bolster its capabilities as it has worked to drastically improve its ability to project power beyond its borders. Whereas Turkey was once unable to conduct maritime operations regularly across even its peripheral seas, today it operates with purpose and determination in the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. Beyond its near-abroad, the Turkish navy has also began conducting naval operations in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, as well as other strategically critical locations such as the Bab El-Mandeb strait. Turkish naval activity is evident even as far as Pakistan, where Turkey hopes to nurture positive economic, political, and military ties as the Turkish navy pursues forward ports with access to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. But this growing confidence abroad could not be possible without some semblance of security at home.
Turkey is a country blessed with immense security in its terrestrial topography. It is protected by formidable mountains, with resource-rich seas beyond them, altogether forming defensive barriers, strategic corridors and straits which protect the Turkish heartland in Anatolia. Turkish military planners understand this geographic reality, and they are confident in Turkey's ability to deter almost any kind of ground attack. With no power posing a significant threat to Turkey by land, the focus of Turkish policymakers has instead turned to matters of maritime security.
Turkey’s maritime boundary does not enjoy the same advantages that its topography provides. While control of the Bosporus strait gives Turkey a unique strategic choke point and a powerful economic tool over any Black Sea powers, Turkey nonetheless possesses a very long coastline stretching across three different seas, with each posing its distinct security challenges. As such Black Sea powers like Russia and EU members across the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas (Such as France, Italy, Greece) do, and will continue to, contest their claims for advantage in Turkey's periphery. Conversely, this weak-point is also an area of immense opportunity for Turkish policymakers today. If Turkey can harness the resources in these three seas for itself, it will turn a strategic weakness into a strength, and set itself on a path to energy independence. Such an opportunity has not gone unnoticed in Ankara.
Throughout the 90s, the Turkish Navy made significant investments in the design and development of a completely indigenous corvette for its naval forces, signalling its intent to nurture domestic shipbuilding. A variety of small naval projects such as this one would eventually become a part of a broader naval build-up project for the Turkish Navy called "MILGEM" initiated by Erdoğan not long after he came to power in 2004. The MILGEM project aims to domestically develop multipurpose corvettes and frigates that can be deployed in a range of missions, including reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, anti-submarine, surface-to-surface, surface-to-air warfare, and amphibious operations. Today, the project covers the construction of four Ada class corvettes and one ELINT (electronic signals intelligence) corvette, four Istanbul class multipurpose frigates and seven TF2000 class anti-air destroyers destined for the Turkish Navy. Recently included in the MILGEM project were also four Jinnah class corvettes intended for the Pakistan Navy.
The naval development project MILGEM is an apt demonstration of the way Turkey's ambitions as a regional and international power can be achieved in the eyes of Turkish policymakers. They believe that by building up naval forces in a hotly contested arena of energy resource exploitation that is the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey would be well-positioned to accomplish its goals. What differentiates Turkey from its regional rivals in this contest (bar Russia, perhaps), is its recent accomplishment in developing an independent naval development program driven primarily by local Turkish industry. Erdoğan's government has given hefty support to defence industry projects focusing on the domestic development and production of aircraft, ships, and advanced weapon systems for the Turkish military more broadly, and the Turkish Navy in particular.
This determination in supporting a domestic arms industry naturally leads one to consider whether Turkey’s ambitions may also be realised via export of arms. If the Turkish defence industry continues to grow its already independent export capacities at a similar rate, Turkey will be in a position to mimic American or Russian models of arms export. This typically means the export of domestic arms products and services to countries abroad, a powerful tool capable of swaying political outcomes of other states in favour of Turkish interests. All of this is to say that Turkey’s emergence as an arms exporter would not only elevate Turkey to a position none of its regional rivals enjoy. Increased Turkish naval activity has made its neighbours feel uneasy, and their concerns are justified.
Of particular concern to the Greek government, for example, are a recent Turkish acquisition of 33 landing crafts, - a significant force designed to land infantry and armoured vehicles on foreign shorelines. Its modern fleet, together with its marine landing forces, pose a considerable threat to a strew of islands in Greece’s east, and these would surely fall to Turkey in any direct military confrontation. On top of that, Turkey’s current subsurface fleet of ten submarines will soon be bolstered by six German U-214 type submarines, built locally with assistance from HDW shipyards. By the year 2027, Turkey will have sixteen highly-capable submarines in operation.
Much sooner however, we will see Turkey bring its first aircraft carrier operational through the MILGEM naval build-up program. Expected to come into service ahead of schedule at the end of 2020, an operational aircraft carrier capable of fielding the F-35 will vastly improve the capabilities of the Turkish Navy. With such an impressive naval modernisation program nearing its completion, Turkey is expected to wield significantly more influence in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, and will no doubt possess greater operational capacity beyond its own shores. With plans for a second aircraft carrier already under consideration by policymakers in Ankara, it is certain that Turkey will be deploying a more capable maritime force than its neighbours.
The addition of a state-of-the-art aircraft carrier to the Turkish navy will bring its maritime force to one aircraft carrier, 16 submarines, 21 frigates, 18 corvettes, 35 missile boats, and 32 mine-sweepers, all of which will be accompanied by 16 reconnaissance aircraft and roughly 40 helicopters. Turkey’s demography is also favourable to its growing maritime force, with the Turkish Navy fielding more sailors than its Eastern Mediterranean competitors. This formidable maritime force also has a long history of Ottoman naval tradition to draw from, and more recently, has also been regularly trained by experienced American naval officers. The bulk of this force will be expected to wield advanced equipment and vehicles, with some already seen in operation in Syria and Libya. As Turkey’s assertiveness grows, so too does it gain invaluable combat experience for its maritime force, a force already more experienced and engaged in combat operations than its near-abroad rivals.
Naval Build-up and the Blue Homeland Doctrine
The vision of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine together with the naval build-up of the “MILGEM” program, are a representation of the aspirations of the Erdoğan government specifically, and Turkish nationalist forces more broadly. Sometimes called neo-Ottoman by commentators today, it is a pervasive force in Turkish politics which calls for Turkey to take a more active role abroad, and exert greater political and economic influence on the region as it once did as the Ottoman Empire. The doctrine is a politically viable project to undertake domestically for this very reason. This political consideration is coupled with an economic one, as the opportunities that a more capable Turkish maritime force provides in securing lucrative energy resources will fill Turkish coffers and alleviate some of the associated costs of energy importation. Together, these economic and political considerations are the major driving force behind the “Blue Homeland” that Turkey aspires to. Success of the goals outlined in the doctrine hinges on Ankara’s ability to secure the energy resources of its peripheral seas.
The significant naval build-up undertaken by the Turks includes not only the procurement of sophisticated ships and aircraft, but also a strategically invaluable investment in domestic technologies for the construction of indigenous weapons systems. By the second half of the 2020s, the Turkish Navy will be operating a force of over 140 ships and 60 aircraft, with a considerably large pool of sailors in its marine forces. The recent Turkish steps to establish well-armed military bases abroad in Libya, Sudan, Qatar, Somalia and Pakistan supports its naval build-up projects, and provides Turkey strategic grounds from which to conduct operations. The appearance of a thriving capacity in purely domestic military production is a sign of a rising international Great Power, one which may soon be influencing political outcomes beyond its borders if the Blue Homeland doctrine is to see its realisation. Evidence of the doctrine’s importance to Turkish military planners today points to this reality.
In March last year, Turkey conducted its largest ever naval combat exercise which it termed “The Blue Homeland.” This exercise was a clear validation of Turkey’s embrace of the military element of the naval doctrine under discussion. Its political validity was later affirmed when, in September of 2019, Erdoğan was photographed with a senior naval commander in front of a “Blue Homeland” photo board. Whether the doctrine has been active for Turkey since 2006 is unknown, but it is impossible for Turkey’s neighbours to ignore that reality anymore, as Turkey is increasingly preparing its naval forces for surface and subsurface warfare.
Several countries have been particularly vocal about Turkish naval manoeuvring, - Israel, France, Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Greece and Cyprus – all take positions contradictory to Turkish plans. Erdoğan and Turkish policymakers are aware that its neighbours are watching, and will likely look for small opportunities to apply the doctrine in a measured way. If Turkey can maintain stability in the region while also securing the energy resources it so desperately desires, it will have successfully emerged as the dominant power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The successful implementation of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine would provide Turkey with energy independence, a boost to its domestic industry, and give it a greater sway in the politics of the wider region. And unless other Mediterranean powers act quickly in safeguarding their own interests, they may find themselves dealing with a more capable, confident and assertive Turkey in the not too distant future.