In Geopolitics This Week
The Prudence of Strategic Ambiguity Over Taiwan, The Limits of Russia’s Return to the Middle East, German-US Deal on the Future of Nord Stream 2, and other stories.
Monday, July 19th
Australia May Have to Undertake a Drastic Green Transition
Australia could reasonably be considered an energy superpower. As a major exporter of coal and natural gas, the country is responsible for a significant portion of the global supply of energy resources. In recent years, Australia has become the largest exporter of LNG in the world, and is the 2nd largest exporter of coal behind Indonesia.
However, at a time when the world is undergoing a transformation in global energy markets, Australia may have to take the initiative in a future where the geopolitical environment the country inhabits is rapidly changing. Christian Downie, Associate professor at the Australian National University, suggests three ways Australia can take advantage of the looming green energy transition, while avoiding the pitfalls of an overreliance on export markets.
First, Australia should harness its solar radiation resources in a bid to become energy self-sufficient as this would reduce vulnerability to potential disruptions to the supply of energy. Second, Australia should pursue a policy of export dominance. By investing in green energies at home, Australia could position itself as a major player in the export of clean electricity, hydrogen and strategic minerals. Third, the accrued economic leverage of a green transformation in Australia has the potential to open up opportunities to influence other countries.
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Policy of Non-alignment For States Caught in the Middle
Against the backdrop of worsening relations between the United States and China, when military cooperation between the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) nations continue to intensify, the region increasingly feels as if its drifting toward a Cold War-like battleground. In such an environment, a non-aligned position may be a natural reaction for any state caught in the middle.
In the same way that the establishment of NATO was a means to balance against the Soviet Union in Europe, so it seems the Quad is intended to become a bulwark against China’s growing power and influence. But China and Russia both fear that the Quad will give the United States a foothold from which to shape the regional order to their disadvantage. A predictable response by China to this Quad structure would be to kickstart a counter-bloc, sealing the fate of Asia into a struggle between two adversarial alliance structures.
Smaller Asian states are already working to avoid a new Cold War in their region. For instance, South Korean and Vietnamese officials have expressed a desire to mediate between the United States and China in their many disputes. These non-aligned states may even jostle to make the two blocs vie for influence through developmental projects, attempting to secure better deals for themselves in the process. But non-alignment does not necessarily mean neutrality or isolation, instead, a position of non-alignment aims to influence each bloc in a way that modifies their geopolitical outlook to a more favourable one to the agent.
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Tuesday, July 20th
The Prudence of Strategic Ambiguity Over Taiwan
As China grows, there are some in the United States who argue that the US should abandon its longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan. The argument goes that the only way to deter any potential Chinese “aggression” toward Taiwan is for the United States to set clear red lines to Beijing.
Such a policy would aim to ‘win without fighting’ by making it clear to Beijing what consequences would follow any drastic Chinese action toward Taiwan, thereby shaping the costs associated with any Chinese calculations regarding Taiwan.
But there are some who disagree. Proponents of continued strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan say that the policy acts as a stabilizing force in US-China relations. Adherents of this view believe that the policy places the onus on China to upend the status quo at their own risk, and thereby minimising risks for the US. They see China’s leaders as rational actors who understand that aggressively overturning the status quo in Taiwan would be a costly endeavour for Beijing.
The danger of abandoning the present state of affairs regarding Taiwan — according to advocates of strategic ambiguity — is that a formal defence commitment between the US and Taiwan would alter Chinese policy calculations and lead to further insecurity. It would further enflame tensions in an already anxious international environment, which to this day is considered a rogue province by Beijing.
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Learning from the War in Afghanistan
Anthony H. Cordesman expects one residual effect of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan to be visible domestically. He foresees a fierce partisan political debate brewing which he believes will focus around blaming the opposing party for America’s failures in Afghanistan, with neither the Democrats or the Republicans likely to delve into the specifics of the defeat.
But in the midst of this potential “who lost the war” debate playing out publicly before the mid-term election, Cordesman stresses the serious need for the United States and its allies to draw lessons from their experiences in Afghanistan.
Cordesman, in writing a report for CSIS, seeks to do that just by examining the range of civil and military lessons to be learned from the entire history of the war. His report finds that the US military had been tasked with trying to uphold a failed system of governance that didn’t support — and even often abused — a large part of the population. Other damning findings note that the US nation-building efforts constantly bred new insurgencies, impacting the surging civil and military costs of the mission.
The report concludes by raising the point of the cost of the war, particularly in relation to the lack of any clear or consistent strategic rationale for continual deployment. The numbers in this regard are staggering, with an estimated $2.261 trillion gone toward the twenty-year campaign. Cordesman’s findings raise poignant questions as to whether the US should ever have committed the resources to the conflict in the first place.
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Wednesday, July 21st
UK and France Agree Deal to Curb Migrant Channel Crossings
The United Kingdom and France have announced the signing of a new bilateral agreement which aims to stop the movement of undocumented people across the English Channel. The agreement stipulates that both countries intensify security procedures across the Channel, and it outlines how the two countries will jointly develop technology to close off routes used by refugees and migrants as they brave the waters in the hopes of reaching the UK.
Priti Patel, the UK Home Secretary, said that under the new deal the number of officers patrolling beaches would double. The joint French-British initiative will see operatives preventing illegal crossings using new equipment, including drones and radar. As Patel herself noted, “thanks to more police patrols on French beaches and enhanced intelligence sharing between our security and law enforcement agencies, we are already seeing fewer migrants leaving French beaches.”
France has also intensified its policing of illegal crossings in the Channel recently, and its forces have reported that it has prevented twice as many crossings so far this year than it had in the same period last year. Hundreds of people, including children, have attempted to cross the Channel to southern England from northern France — navigating one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.
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US May Seek to Deny China Military Bases in the Middle East
To the United States, the greatest beneficiary of the current international order, a state of affairs in which China can project power globally is a nightmare scenario. For China to be in any position to do that, however, its energy supply chains must rely less on external markets and the Chinese economy needs to be resilient to international shocks. As a heavy importer of energy, China is especially interested in the Middle East, which is home to some of the world’s largest oil reserves.
US military planners only have to look at Djibouti — Beijing’s only foreign military base — for a potential blueprint of exactly what a Chinese foreign military presence looks like. Given that the base in Djibouti is already a matter of concern for US military leaders, it doesn’t seem a stretch to say that it aligns with US national interests to prevent China from acquiring another strategic base elsewhere in the region.
One way the US could counter any such move is by incentivising their regional allies to reject any bid by China of taking ownership of a military base. By providing economic or military incentives in the form of bilateral agreements, the US can apply persuade these countries to reject any Chinese military association agreements, and thereby Washington may be able to minimise the leverage China in formulating any military lease agreements. In the increasingly hostile competition between the US and China, Washington may even choose to deploy sanctions toward any country in the region working to attract a Chinese military presence.
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Thursday, July 22nd
The Limits of Russia’s Return to the Middle East
Russia's military intervention in Syria marked the country’s return to the Middle East as a major power broker. Russian airpower and Iranian proxy forces have saved Bashar al-Assad’s government. The choice to intervene on behalf of its ally has allowed Moscow to rekindle old partnerships and establish new ones at a time the United States, worn out by nearly two decades of war, is eager to redeploy its assets to the Indo-Pacific.
But Russia’s returning role must take into account the interests of regional players. The dominant regional power structure is the coalition sometimes called the Counterrevolutionary Bloc, which consists of Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. Washington maintains strong ties to each of these countries, and remains the dominant security guarantor for the wider region.
Relations are changing however, as the countries which form the Counterrevolutionary Bloc are all engaging with the latest major entrant to the region: Russia. These regional powers can take advantage of this opportunity to exploit the arrival of Russia for their own ends by attempting to deepen ties with Moscow, but ultimately, there are limits to further engagement because relations would be complicated by already established links with the US. And when it comes to security arrangements in the Middle East, Russia is still not capable of replacing the United States as the predominant power anytime soon.
Russia’s return to the Middle East has nonetheless opened avenues for regional powers to exploit great-power politics to their own advantage. But while Washington’s arms exports and trade with regional powers far surpasses that of Moscow, and while Washington continues to underwrite the security arrangements of the region, it is unlikely that this geopolitical state of affairs will dramatically shift due to the arrival of Russia. Still, if relations between Moscow and Washington were to deteriorate further, both powers may begin to compete more aggressively against each other, with the residual effects of any increased competition likely to influence the calculations of local powers.
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German-US Deal on the Future of Nord Stream 2
Uncertainty surrounding the future of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline appears to be dispelled as the United States and Germany have announced a deal over the completion of the gas pipeline.
The agreement will waiver all US sanctions, allowing for the completion of the project, and will commit Germany to a policy of support toward Ukraine and Poland. As both Ukraine and Poland are bypassed by the project and are adversarial toward Russia, the US-German agreement will see the funding of alternative energy and development projects in these two countries. Under the terms of the deal, Washington and Berlin jointly committed to countering Russian attempts at using energy supplies as a political weapon.
But Berlin has further commitments of its own, namely that it has committed to utilize all available leverage to “facilitate an extension of up to 10 years to Ukraine’s gas transit agreement with Russia.”
The deal also commits Berlin to take actions at a national and European level to limit Russian exports in the event that Russia uses energy as a weapon or violates Ukrainian sovereignty. The deal is designed to ensure that Germany will maintain a policy of support for Poland and Ukraine, and will limit Russia in its use and misuse of any energy pipeline.
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Friday, July 23rd
United States Working to Save Military Pact with the Philippines
Relations between the Philippines and the United States have strained under the Duterte administration. While his anti-American outbursts haven’t helped relations, it was Duterte’s decision to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement — a military pact which provides the legal framework for the US presence in the Philippines — that have caused the most grievance to the US.
An end to the pact would mean a failure to the Biden administration, as it would weaken the US presence in the region at a time the current administration is seeking to build a coalition of allies with the intention of containing China. To avoid a scenario where a the containment is broken by a China-aligned state, the US is sending a political team to negotiate with Duterte. There is hope the deal may be extended, as Philippine Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez said that the upcoming meeting between officials will demonstrate that “the relationship that we have with the United States remains strong and stable.”
The United States is sending US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to the region in order to strengthen bilateral ties with a string of countries essential to US strategy going forward. Austin will also be making stops in Singapore and Vietnam, with the goal of showing that “the United States remains a reliable partner, a friend who shows up when it counts.” But the countries on the list of Austin’s tour all have extensive trade ties with China, so it will be interesting to follow developments with an eye on the wider confrontation.
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What Happens Now in Nagorno-Karabakh?
After the somewhat humiliating defeat of Armenian forces to Azerbaijan, little has been resolved and the many intractable political differences between the two remain. Despite the operational victory for Azerbaijan, fundamental issues between the two powers have not been solved via a political settlement, nor has there been much change to the broader issue of the territory beyond the limited gains already made by Baku.
The result of the conflict appears to be embitterment for Armenia and territorial consolidation for Azerbaijan. But with little political will for a settlement and vastly differing interpretations of rights and claims of either party, the border is not expected to remain stable. Border clashes will remain, but the involvement of more powerful actors — such as Turkey, Russia and the United States — will certainly put limits on what each side can do.
In Baku, policymakers must have realised that despite achieving an overwhelming victory over Armenian forces, they have not been able to negotiate a political settlement. For Armenia, the country’s military has proven to be obsolete and the humiliating manner in which its armed forces were defeated may lead to political turbulence domestically. Whatever comes next, the presence of Russian peacekeepers will mean that in the near-term at least, conflict may be limited to diplomatic spats and minor border skirmishes.
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