In Geopolitics This Week
Israeli Forces Cross Litani River as Lebanon Talks Approach, South Korea Formalises Nuclear Submarine Construction Programme, Turkey Steps Into the Sahel Security Vacuum, and other stories.
Israeli Forces Cross Litani River as Lebanon Talks Approach
Israeli forces crossed north of the Litani River this week, taking positions on the outskirts of the twin Zawtar villages around 30 km from the border. The 36th Division moved through Deir Siryan with armoured vehicles including Merkava tanks. The Zawtar villages sit at the join between Hezbollah’s eastern and western fronts, and the new Israeli positions cut the link between the two. The crossing began on the day the first direct Israeli-Lebanese military meeting opened in Washington. The Litani has been the explicit ceiling of the buffer zone Israel has formalised since the November 2024 ceasefire, with five hilltop positions held inside Lebanese territory. North-bank positions push that ceiling forward at the moment the disarmament negotiation opens, fixing ground facts before the ceasefire expires next month.
Hezbollah’s combat profile has shifted toward fibre-optic-guided FPV drones, which can’t be jammed and have a range of around 20 km. The group has released footage of strikes on Iron Dome launchers at Jal al-Alam and on the commander of the 401st Armoured Brigade. The channel Hezbollah uses to coordinate with the Lebanese state is itself mid-reshuffle, with Naim Qassem removing the head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit since 1987 and replacing him with Hussein Abdullah, a figure closer to Qassem himself. The Lebanese army announced completion of phase one of its disarmament plan south of the Litani in January, but has stalled on phase two covering the territory between the Litani and the Awali River further north. The army has held its position at checkpoint arrests and inspections rather than direct confrontation, with around 40% of the officer corps drawn from Shia communities tied to Hezbollah’s base.
In Gaza, Israeli forces finished a months-long engineering operation this week destroying around 11 km of Hamas tunnels in Beit Hanoun. Days earlier, Israeli forces killed Hamas military wing chief Mohammed Odeh in a strike on the Rimal district of Gaza City, less than two weeks after killing his predecessor Izz al-Din al-Haddad. Israeli forces now hold around 64% of the Strip against the 53% set out in the October ceasefire, an 11-point expansion beyond the Yellow Line, with Netanyahu directing further expansion to 70%. Israeli outposts are being built along the Yellow Line behind a multi-layered barrier, and the IDF has declared the area south of the Zahrani River a “war zone”, pushing the operating area to around 40 km from the border. A single doctrine connects the two theatres: territorial expansion ahead of negotiation, with buffer zones and barrier infrastructure fixing the outer limit of Israeli control before any settlement freezes the lines.
South Korea Formalises Nuclear Submarine Construction Programme
South Korea has released the Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea Nuclear-Powered Submarine, formalising entry into the small group of states that operate nuclear-powered submarines. The plan, named Jangbogo-N, will deliver a domestically designed and built attack submarine of around 5,000 tons, with first launch in the mid-2030s and four hulls planned. Operational entry will place the country alongside the US, Russia, China, France, the UK and India as the seventh state with such a fleet. The reactor will run on low-enriched uranium below 20% U-235, with refuelling cycles long enough to limit how often the boat returns to port. A joint fact sheet supports eventual Korean civil enrichment and reprocessing rights, with around $150bn in Korean investment in US shipyards forming the industrial side of the package.
The fuel cycle is where the structural significance sits. LEU cores below 20% need roughly twice the space of the weapons-grade highly enriched cores the US, UK and Russia use to last the same time at sea, which means either larger reactor vessels or mid-life refuelling of the kind France runs on its Barracuda submarines. The proliferation profile runs differently from HEU. HEU is weapons-usable but locked inside sealed reactor units; LEU below 20% is not weapons-usable, but a Korean operator would need refuelling access and, paired with domestic enrichment, would hold the materials and skills to produce weapons-grade fuel without yet doing so, a stipulation Washington has long restricted in 123 Agreement partners. Naval reactors have historically used Paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153 to suspend routine IAEA inspections on submarine fuel. Australia became the first state without nuclear weapons to use that provision under the AUKUS treaty; South Korea becomes the second.
The Pacific underwater environment South Korea is entering is shifting fast. China launched its first Type 095 attack submarine at Bohai shipyard in February, with quieter rudder and propulsion designs than any previous Chinese boat. Chinese yards have launched ten nuclear submarines over the past five years, with the regional undersea balance reordering around the launch tempo of competing producers rather than current commissioned strength. The US-ROK 123 Agreement currently caps South Korean enrichment at 20%, bars reprocessing, and prohibits using US-origin material for military purposes. Every refuelling cycle across the submarine operational life will require fresh US fuel authorisation, making the propulsion programme an ongoing political instrument as much as a procurement decision.
Turkey Steps Into the Sahel Security Vacuum
Turkey’s Defence Minister stated during Efes military drills last weekend that several African states have asked Ankara to replicate the security arrangement it built in Somalia, naming Sudan, Niger, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia among the candidates. The vacuum Ankara is moving into opened across 2023 and 2024 with the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the G5 Sahel and ECOWAS, the expulsion of French and US forces, and the dissolution of a joint counter-terrorism framework. Russian Africa Corps stepped into the immediate combat space, but its operations have narrowed toward defending the capitals, leaving conventional territorial security uncovered.
The Somalia template is what Ankara is now offering elsewhere. It trades training, forward bases and drone supply for infrastructure projects and a share of resource revenue. Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu has operated since 2017 and trained roughly one-third of the Somali National Army, with three F-16s, ATAK helicopters and armed drones deployed to Mogadishu alongside new hangar construction. The resource side runs on an agreement giving Ankara a 30% share of Somali offshore oil and gas, with the survey ship Oruç Reis mapping the seabed. Turkish officials estimate the blocks hold up to 20 billion barrels of crude. The defence-export economics carry the rest of the offer. Turkish arms exports have more than doubled over the past five years, with sales to Africa nearly quadrupling. Nigeria is the largest African recipient, mostly combat helicopters. Eighteen African states fly Turkish drones, with the TB2 priced at $2-5m per unit against three to four times that for comparable Western or Israeli drones.
Turkish supply meets NATO standards while carrying fewer political conditions than equivalent Western systems. That fits between Western supply and Russian combat deployment in a way neither alternative offers: a NATO-standard military partner without Western governance demands, and a full-spectrum security package rather than Russia’s narrow regime-protection contract. Bayraktar TB2s have gone to Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, with Anka and Akıncı systems sold to the same states and Chad. Turkish contracts package the platform, training, maintenance and operating doctrine together rather than selling each separately, with more than 25 defence-industry agreements across Africa covering joint production and technology transfer.
Monday, May 25th
US Publishes New Shipbuilding Plan — FPRI
EU and Mexico Sign Modernised Trade Agreement — EU Business
Russia Repositions Five Satellites to Shadow ICEYE-X36 — Weapons & Strategy
Iran Restores Shahed Production During Ceasefire — Asia Times
Russia Deploys Oreshnik IRBM Against Bila Tserkva Airbase — FT
Astana Blocks Asset Seizure Against Gazprom — Oil Price
Tuesday, May 26th
South Korea Formalises Nuclear Submarine Construction Programme — TWZ
Turkey Expands Security-Resource Model Across African Mainland — MEE
Quad Mobilises $20 Billion for Critical Minerals and Port Infrastructure — Nikkei
US Strikes Iranian Coastal Positions During Qatar Negotiations — FT
Quantum Competition Bifurcates Along Material Lines — Asia Times
Lithium Triangle Opens to Foreign Investment — Stratfor
Wednesday, May 27th
UK and Poland Sign Treaty Co-Producing Air Defence Missile — Euro News
Gulf States Build Opposed South Asian Defence Architectures — Al-Monitor
US-India Bilateral Framework Targets Indian Processing Gap — Al Jazeera
Uruguay Deepens UK Ties Across Defence and Institutional Architecture — Merco Press
UAE and Iraq Construct Pipeline Capacity Outside Hormuz — Nikkei
India’s Crude Slate Reorganises Around Atlantic Basin Suppliers — Oil Price
Thursday, May 28th
US and Iran Reach 60-Day Framework for Hormuz Reopening — MEE
China’s Import Standards Restructure SE Asian Agricultural Supply — Asia Times
NPT Review Conference Fails for Third Consecutive Cycle — Responsible Statecraft
India Controls Nepal’s Hydropower Exports — The Diplomat
Israeli Forces Cross Litani River as Lebanon Talks Approach — FT
Maritime Infrastructure Sits Outside Coastal Jurisdiction — War on the Rocks
Friday, May 29th
Vietnam and Singapore Expand Partnership — CNA
Sweden Transfers Gripen to Close Ukrainian Air-to-Air Range Gap — TWZ
US Expands Joint Military Strikes Across Central American States — NYT
China’s Nuclear Submarine Programme Expands Undersea Capability — Eurasia Review
Thai-Cambodian Border Closure Severs Japanese Corridor — Nikkei
Kazakhstan Signs $4 Billion Uranium Contract with India — Geopolitical Monitor
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