In Geopolitics This Week
A Lack of Empathy in US Foreign Policy Discourse, Study Ranks Countries by Their Capabilities in the Cyber Domain, Turkey Likely to Maintain Military Presence in Libya, and other stories.
Monday, June 28th
Russia Faces Competition in the Caspian Sea Going Forward
While the Russian Caspian Flotilla has long been the dominant naval force on the Caspian Sea, things are quickly changing. Four other littoral states of the Caspian — Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan — have been boosting their naval capabilities, all with an eye on future access to oil and natural gas resources.
The Russian Caspian Flotilla is currently composed of only 27 major vessels, with Russia having shifted some of its Caspian-based ships to the Sea of Azov via the Volga–Don Canal. Russia’s redeployment of some of its Caspian naval assets has led to a scenario in which Russia may no longer be the dominant naval power in the Caspian Sea.
Azerbaijan has modernised its Caspian fleet through the purchases of advanced ships from Israel and Turkey, and now possesses a fleet of roughly 44 vessels. While many of these vessels are smaller than ships in the Caspian Flotilla, many of them are more advanced and heavily armed. And Azerbaijan is not the only littoral Caspian Sea power bolstering its capabilities.
Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have all made significant investments into their respective Caspian fleets. Kazakhstan wields even more ships than either Russia or Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan may be the most capable of the littoral powers, having increased its Caspian presence to the point of almost rivalling the Russian presence. And Iran, while less advanced than the others and operating with naval assets in desperate need of modernisation, has also been bolstering its presence on the Caspian.
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Brunei Releases Latest Defence White Paper
At the end of May, Brunei released the latest iteration of its defence white paper. The Defense White Paper 2021 was launched by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and other officials in celebration of the diamond jubilee of the Royal Brunei Air Force, with the ceremony taking place at the Brunei Arts and Handicraft Training Center in Bandar Seri Begawan.
Though the oil-rich sultanate is often overlooked, it does possess the capabilities to exert its own influence in a variety of ways. Brunei has been a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, advancing the interests of the state by continually restating its historical rights in the region in order to maintain its claims under international law. Brunei has also developed certain capabilities necessary to combat counterterrorism at home, and has been a very active member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly regarding issues of security.
This latest white paper comes at a time when the Southeast Asian nation will have to navigate a tense regional environment, with China and the US unwilling to wind down their combative rhetoric. The document recognises this reality, and the path it outlines signifies that Brunei will seek to work closer with both the US and China in order to realise its own national development. To achieve this, policymakers in Brunei will have to carefully consider its policies to ensure that neither China nor the US is perceived to be favoured above the other.
On the whole, the document builds on existing foundations while also making some notable changes, including a new focus on grey zone threats, joint operations, and a push for greater self-reliance.
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Tuesday, June 29th
A Lack of Empathy in US Foreign Policy Discourse
In instances where the reasons and foundations for conflict are not well understood between two hostile powers, and the level of animosity spirals beyond anything considered reasonable, states are either too confused or mistaken about the underlying reasons for conflict. In these circumstances, finding a remedy to the problem of deteriorating relations is more difficult.
Stephen Walt writes of the importance of empathy in international relations — the ability to perceive another power’s problems from their perspective. Because it is far more costly to persuade a rival power to change its behaviour without an understanding of the origins of their particular perspective, it is critical to grasp how others see a situation in order to understand why they pursue the actions that they do.
Failure to do so leads to what social psychologist Lee Ross called the “fundamental attribution error,” the tendency to emphasise explanations of behaviour in terms of dispositions rather than situations or circumstances. If two conflicting powers believe their rival’s actions are voluntary while at the same time believing that their own actions are a defensive response to external conditions they have little control over, finding common ground will be next to impossible.
He compares Russia’s policy toward Ukraine with the United States’ policy toward Nicaragua in the 1980s. Walt notes that in each case, a great power was concerned that developments in a nearby country might lead it to realign with its rival, and therefore sought to organise and support a violent uprising to challenge the sitting government.
But a dissonance is apparent when exploring how these strikingly similar policies receive vastly different treatment in the United States. While Americans saw and presented their policies toward Nicaragua as a circumstance forced upon them, Putin’s actions in Ukraine were largely discussed as purely voluntary, reckless, and as undeniable evidence of Putin’s and his regime’s problematic character.
The prescient point that Walt makes is that the United States would be better served if it devoted more effort to exploring opportunities to resolve disputes through genuine diplomacy, first and foremost with an empathetic analysis of an adversaries’ motivation, instead of casting foreign powers as actors possessed by evil, evil that must be vanquished if good is ever to triumph.
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Study Ranks Countries by Their Capabilities in the Cyber Domain
The International Institute for Strategic Studies has published a report in which they perform an in-depth analysis of the cyber capabilities of fifteen leading nations in the field. The study was conducted over a two-year period and aims to assist policymakers by highlighting the capabilities which most accurately represent a nation’s cyber capabilities.
The authors examined capabilities under seven categories: strategy and doctrine; governance, command and control; core cyber-intelligence capability; cyber empowerment and dependence; cyber security and resilience; global leadership in cyberspace affairs; and offensive cyber capability.
Their findings are organised around three categories: tier one cyber powers possess world-leading strengths in all categories; tier two cyber powers possess world-leading strengths in some of the categories; and tier three cyber powers possess potential strengths in some of the categories in the methodology with significant weaknesses in others.
The United States was the only power that ranked in the top tier, meaning it possesses an overall position of cyber dominance. Tier two powers possessing world-leading capabilities in some of the categories includes Australia, Canada, China, France, Israel, Russia and the United Kingdom. Among those classified under tier three cyber powers were India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea and Vietnam, all possessing potential strengths in some of the categories.
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Wednesday, June 30th
The Rising Geopolitical Significance of Rare Earth Elements
Rare Earth Elements (REEs) are increasingly becoming a central facet of a geopolitical struggle by virtue of their value in the modern age of technology. The 17 different REEs have received increasing attention from academics, analysts and the media due to their widespread application in modern technology. More recently, the focus of much of the REE-related discussion has revolved around the rise of China.
Given that competition between the United States and China appears to be the geopolitical conundrum of the first half of the 21st century, many academics and analysts in the US have stressed the dangerous implications of China’s monopoly on REEs. This monopoly is considerable, with China possessing roughly 44 million metric tons of REE reserves, which is a considerable portion of the 120 million metric tons estimated global reserves.
The US was once the leading producer of rare earths until China’s REE production started ramping up over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The Mountain Pass Mine located in California used to be the world’s largest producer of REEs, but, unable to compete with Chinese REE exports, was forced to close down. While today the California mine is once again operational, it remains partly owned by a Chinese company — a serious concern for US policymakers seeking to shift supply chains away from China.
Although China’s slice of the pie has decreased since the early 2000s, China still holds a strong hand in the global supply of REEs. For the US, a lack of access to REEs may result in considerable adverse “economic, military, and political implications.” For this reason, US policymakers are seeking to formulate a coherent REE strategy which will reduce dependence on China for the supply of REEs.
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Turkey Likely to Maintain Military Presence in Libya
Last week, negotiations over Libya’s political future resumed under the second Berlin Conference. During this round of negotiations, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu expressed his country’s hesitance to a withdrawal of Turkish troops. This meant that at the conclusion of the conference, under Article V concerning the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Libya, the joint document included a footnote expressing Turkey’s legal reservations toward withdrawing its troops.
Turkey insists that its military forces maintain a presence in the country — giving Turkish military personnel a unique status in the shape of a formal invitation from Libya’s governing authorities. Given that the reservation is noted in the final document, Turkey now possesses a legal mechanism by which it can maintain a military footprint in Libya via a reservation in international law — a caveat to a state's acceptance of a binding agreement.
While the document agreed upon in the conference is not legally binding, Turkey is nonetheless demanding that its presence in Libya be legitimized and the agreements that the Turkish government made with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in late 2019 be recognized as legally binding. Having the veneer of international legitimacy allows Turkey to continue to develop a tangible de jure case for maintaining a military presence in Libya going forward.
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Thursday, July 1st
US Foreign Affairs Experts Weigh in on Exit from Afghanistan
Foreign Affairs has approached dozens of individuals who are seen as authorities wielding specialised expertise in the field of US foreign policy, and posed them a survey question regarding the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. Participants were asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed with the following proposition: the United States is right to withdraw all its military forces from Afghanistan. This broad survey on the policy issue of Afghanistan is a rare birds-eye glimpse of the perspectives of some prominent figures in US foreign policy.
Among those that strongly agrees with the proposition is strategist Edward N. Luttwak, who is confident that the United States should have left Afghanistan six months after the initial 2001 invasion. In a similar vein, “But better late than never,” says international relations realist John Mearsheimer, who also takes a swipe at the American foreign policy community in his brief statement.
But there are some who strongly disagree with the proposition as well, and those who hold such a view beat out those who strongly agree in number by a single individual. One such perspective from this camp comes from the president of the Brookings Institute, John R. Allen, who says that the withdrawal from Afghanistan will diminish the ability of the US and its allies to “leverage events on behalf of the Afghans.”
Former US Commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, David Petraeus, fears that the United States will “deeply regret this decision.” He suggests that the right course of action would be to maintain a sustainable commitment which works in tandem with Afghan forces.
I’ve spoken here about a few of the more polarised opinions from those surveyed, but there is a healthy number of differing views that lie in-between these two contrasting positions on the proposition. If you’re interested in exploring what other prominent figures of the US foreign policy community think on the issue, as well as some of the justification statements accompanying their positions, I would suggest clicking the link below.
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Turkey’s Dance Between the US and Russia
The recent meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Joe Biden appears to be more spin than substance. While both leaders agreed in their recent meeting that Turkey would take a lead role in securing the Kabul airport amidst a US withdrawal, they were apparently not able to resolve the thorny issue that has strained ties between Washington and Ankara — Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 system.
Dimitar Bechev, writing for the Royal United Services Institute, argues that Ankara wants to retain good relations with the US, — despite the hostile rhetoric of recent years — while at the same cooperating with Moscow where their interests coincide. He notes that there will be of opportunities for the Kremlin to score points in the future and that the relationship is most notably driven by economic concerns, particularly tourism.
There were many tests to the Russia–Turkey relationship over the last few years, but ties have proven resilient even when the interests of the two Black Sea powers collide. As Bechev notes, the relationship withstood three major tests over the course of 2020 alone: Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. In all these conflicts, each power supports different sides and each has differing geopolitical aims, yet ties have not significantly deteriorated.
Simply put, Turkey is playing both sides to maximise its geopolitical gains. Its attempting to deal with Russia on its own terms by leveraging the country’s position in NATO as well as its strategic significance to the US. At the same time, Turkey works in tandem with Russia much to the chagrin of policymakers in NATO member states.
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Friday, July 2nd
US Navy Abandons Railgun to Focus on Hypersonic Missiles
It appears that the US Navy’s pursuit of an operational railgun aboard its vessels has been abandoned. Reports suggest that the electric-powered weapon, capable of firing projectiles at up to seven times the speed of sound, has unimpressed in testing and will no longer be pursued. As Matthew Caris, a defence analyst, succinctly put it: “The railgun is, for the moment, dead.”
The US Navy has been pursuing the viability of electromagnetic railgun weapons for over a decade, and even considered putting them on Zumwalt-class destroyers. The technology went through intensive testing, during which the development ran into a number of problems. Those included a low maximum range of about 110 miles, — making any vessel fitted with such a weapon susceptible to missile fire — as well as a low rate of fire making the technology limited in defensive contingencies.
This means the US Navy will be seeking to fill the strategic gap with other capabilities, namely — hypersonic missiles. Navy spokesperson, Lt. Courtney Callaghan, said that the Navy’s decision frees up resources for the pursuit of hypersonic missiles, directed-energy systems, and electronic warfare systems. The US Navy has also been seeking a hypervelocity projectile that can be fired from existing gun systems.
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Quantum Sensors May Replace Radar in Battlefields of the Future
New experimental technologies can be dangerously disruptive to the status quo and they have the potential of bringing about great change in existing balances of power. A new kind of sensor, called ‘quantum radar,’ is one such military technology, potentially offering the promise of stealth detection to the defender. While still in its early stages and with numerous technical limitations, it could one day shift current assumptions regarding defensive and offensive warfare.
The main problem with implementing the technology lies in its limited range. In 2015, a study concluded that the effective range of such radars would be under 7 miles, while in 2016, a Chinese team claimed to have a functional quantum radar with a range of 61 miles. But the ability to detect stealth aircraft and UAVs would still be a considerable capability. And as development matures over time, particularly at a time when the F-35 stealth craft is said to be the most advanced fighter of its time, quantum radars may have consequences in geopolitical terms.
Quantum radars represent a potentially revolutionary technology in military terms. It has the potential to transform warfare in the 21st century by making stealth technology obsolete, and could therefore impact deterrence calculations first and foremost. But for now, the technology is far from being operational on a battlefield, and uncertainty remains around whether it can live up to such a potential.
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