In Geopolitics This Week
The perils of NATO Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia, Biden's European tour kicks off in Cornwall, Turkey may gave a role to play in Afghanistan, and other stories.
Monday, June 7th
Could US-South Korean Economic Interests be Diverging?
Moon Jae-in, the President of South Korea, was the second foreign leader to visit the White House following the inauguration of the Biden administration. It was a clear signal of how important Asia is to the new president.
The two leaders talked up the decision of Hyundai, Samsung, LG, and SK to invest $25 billion into US facilities for manufacturing computer chips, electric vehicle batteries, and similar cutting-edge technologies. In return, the United States pledged to help South Korea ramp up its vaccination campaign against COVID-19. The two countries also promised to strengthen their partnership on R&D in such fields as IT and AI.
But as the Biden administration is continuing the process of decoupling strategic supply chains away from China, South Korea has no intention of decoupling from China. South Korea’s largest trading partner is China and many South Korean exports to China become components in goods that then get sent to the United States. For this reason, among many others, tensions in the US-China competition will inevitably have a negative effect on the South Korean economy.
In sum, what the meeting between the two leaders showed was that economic cooperation between the United States and South Korea continues business as usual. But because they are both bracing for some disruption in relations with China, and one partner (SK) has a lot more to lose than the other (US) as relations with China deteriorate, the interests of the US and South Korea could diverge.
Read more about this story here.
On What Areas Might the Biden-Putin Summit Lead to Agreement
The last time Joe Biden met Vladimir Putin their meeting did not seem to go well. Supposedly, during the March 2011 meeting, the-then vice president Biden urged the then-prime minister Putin not to return to the Kremlin, and then claimed to have reached certain conclusions about the (lack of) existence of his Russian counterpart’s soul after the meeting. And Putin seems to have lost no love for Biden either. More than a decade has passed since that meeting in Russia, and there have been no indications since that time that Biden’s and Putin’s views of each other have improved.
But those differences should not prevent the two leaders from trying to prevent further deterioration of the bilateral relationship when the they meet in Switzerland on June 16.
Biden and his administration have recently signalled their interest in attempting to stabilize the US-Russian relationship, making overtures in the form of conciliatory statements and granting sanctions waivers. Similarly, key members of Putin’s team have also spoken of the need for stability and compromise in the US-Russia relationship. If stabilization of the US-Russian relationship is, indeed, an end that Biden and Putin agree is worth pursuing, then what would be the means to attain that end?
A partial reversal of restrictions on diplomatic personnel and a resumption of the dialogue on strategic stability could be among the means which the leaders can agree upon at their summit in Geneva. However, expecting that Biden and Putin would agree to some kind of a broad reset or reach deals on major issues like a common set of rules in the cyber domain, or resolutions to the conflicts in Ukraine or Syria, would be unrealistic.
Read more about this story here.
Tuesday, June 8th
Chinese Mercenaries in Africa
Chinese investments in Africa have multiplied in recent years, especially since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A new generation of private security companies from China see the BRI as an ideal opportunity for lucrative contracts and international expansion.
Currently, the few certified Chinese private security companies operating in Africa appear to be doing so semi-autonomously and thus far, these guns-for-hire do not appear to be carrying out operations for the state. But these companies may yet be the tool Beijing needs in order to effectively defend its citizens and assets, and thereby avoiding a costly military intervention beyond its reach.
The opening of the naval base in Djibouti in 2017 was a signal that China was operating in an environment which demanded more security for its citizens and its interests. Before then, the Chinese presence in Africa was almost entirely devoted to trade and economic development, with the United States carrying the lion's share of the military and counterterrorism effort.
The private security market in Africa is characterized by several particularities, such as the existence of numerous armed groups offering their services, highly competent private military contractors supporting local governments or serving non-African interests.
Since 2018, Beijing has promoted talks on new capabilities for African security forces, defence cooperation and strengthening Afro-Chinese military relations at the China-Africa Forum on Security and Defense. Throughout its engagement in Africa, China has realized that it is a mistake to entrust security and development to trade alone, which has opened the door for Chinese policymakers to a better understanding of the limitations of integrating security, conflict resolution and economic development.
Read more about this story here.
Turkey’s Economy Remains Fragile
The economic growth Turkey has seen this year is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term, according to analysis conducted at Stratfor, as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pushes to cut interest rates in ways that could further destabilize the country’s already fragile currency and financial situation.
Erdogan has made clear in statements that he wants to ease Turkey’s high-interest rates despite the fact that inflation is soaring in the country. While currency or debt crises are not imminent, capital flight and tighter financial market conditions point to accelerating trends in that direction.
Politically, Turkey’s long-term economic outlook could also threaten Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) grasp on power. Pressure from Erdogan for interest rate cuts could further weaken the exchange rate and spur other negative political and economic implications. Further, fragile economic growth may give the political opposition of AKP another sticking point against the government’s economic strategy. And all of this is compounded by the record low polling numbers for the AKP due mainly to the deteriorating economic situation.
Read more about this story here.
Wednesday, June 9th
The Perils of NATO Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia
When Russia deployed roughly 100,000 troops to the Ukrainian border earlier this year, the move alarmed policymakers in Europe and the United States, who broadly condemned the military build-up as another form of Russian aggression. But there is more to the story than just a clear-eyed view of an aggressor and a victim. It would be prudent to examine exactly why Russia chose to mobilise such a vast force at its border with neither the intention to commit to exercises or an outright invasion.
Ukraine, it appears, is something of a red line for Russia, as Russia’s foreign ministry spokesperson made clear when he warned that NATO membership for Ukraine could entail “irreversible consequences for the Ukrainian statehood.” In an address to the nation shortly thereafter, President Vladimir Putin made sure to caution the EU and US about crossing Russia’s red lines.
As Henrik B. L. Larsen writing for War on the Rocks points out, Russia may have been merely flexing its military muscles in order to prevent an attempt by Ukraine to draw closer to the reality of full NATO membership. Preventing Ukraine, as well as Georgia, from joining NATO is among Russia’s key geopolitical objectives, and one that the Russian state is likely willing to use military force to achieve.
With a more prudent view than we are used to reading, Larsen takes the position that extending full-fledged security commitments to Ukraine and Georgia would overstretch NATO requirements beyond any degree of realism. Further, he notes that combat troops are neither trained nor structured to be in any position to effectively fight in gray-zone operations, which are below the threshold of NATO’s collective defence obligations. Finally, he asserts that accepting Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, at a time when NATO is unable to adequately support these countries, would inevitably expose enlargement as a “gigantic bluff” that would tarnish NATO’s credibility as a defence alliance thereafter.
Read more about this story here.
The Growth of South Korean Missile Capabilities
In a recent post I discussed the recent summit meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and how the alliance may have some divergences in economic interests. But politically and militarily, the picture is entirely different.
The summit saw the two countries commit to enhanced cooperation in a number of areas, but most significant for our purposes was the removal of restrictions on South Korea’s missile program. South Korea can now make missiles to reach anywhere it wants. This change in policy means that within a few years, South Korea may be capable of striking targets beyond North Korea, including China and Russia.
While the decision may lead to a potential arms race on the Korean Peninsula, it enables South Korea to more effectively deter against adversaries. That gives enough reason, argues Eli Fuhrman writing for 19fortyfive, for the US to stop subsidizing South Korea’s defence.
South Korea’s Hyunmoo series of missiles are the other mainstay of South Korea’s missile arsenal. In March last year, South Korea pushed its missile development further than before as it conducted a test of the Hyunmoo-4 ballistic missile, which is said to be capable of carrying a large payload and of reaching targets up to 800 km away.
Read more about this story here.
Thursday, June 10th
Indonesia’s Necessary Renewable Energy Transition
The Indonesian Energy and Mineral Resources Minister, Arifin Tasrif, has said that the country’s oil reserves contain roughly 4.17 billion barrels of oil left. This means that Indonesia’s oil reserves will likely run out in about 10 years if no new reserves are discovered. Similarly, the country’s natural gas reserves are estimated to be exhausted in roughly 22 years. This may precipitate a policy turn to renewables given the implications of rapidly-dwindling domestic sources of energy.
The issue for Indonesia is that the price of renewable energy electricity can be expensive, which makes it difficult to compete with other sources of electricity. This electricity price gap has made negotiations for the Power Purchase Agreement drag on, and without a drastic turn to renewable energies, Indonesia may find itself forced into importing more and more energy. Furthermore, an energy model focused around sustainable energies is also attractive to Jakarta due to the high levels of pollution in Indonesia, which has moderately unsafe air quality.
Given that time is limited, Jakarta must quickly seek out a path to solutions. All this must be undertaken while Jakarta simultaneously faces other challenges, such as poor technological development, a low-skilled workforce, and the increasingly likely supply chain disruptions caused by intensified US-China competition.
Read more about this story here.
US President Makes First Stop in European Tour
President Joe Biden has arrived in Cornwall for his first G7 summit, which will be starting tomorrow in Carbis Bay and conclude on Sunday.
Air Force One landed in the early hours at Newquay Airport from RAF Mildenhall where Biden gave a speech in which he said that "the United States is back and the democracies of the world are standing together to face the toughest challenges." His stated agenda focuses on leading democracies to confrontation with China, global economic reform, as well as reaching development goals.
The Biden administration will be seeking European support to more effectively shut China out from furthering its growing influence in shaping the rules of the international economy. Biden has particularly emphasised that the US and its allies must offer “a high-standard alternative to China for upgrading physical, digital and health infrastructure that is more resilient and supports global development.”
However, rallying Europe behind the US in a unified voice may yet be an insurmountable task for Biden due to the extent of economic relations between EU member states and China. For instance, in 2020, 8 percent of German exports went to China, which is almost as much as German exports to the United States (8.6 percent). And Germany — the economic bedrock of the EU — is a highly export-dependent economy, which means that concessions to the US regarding China will have a direct influence on Germany’s bottom-line.
Read more about this story here.
Friday, June 11th
Turkey May Have a Role to Play in Afghanistan as the US Leaves
Turkey’s relationship with the United States can be described as a soured one in recent memory. One of the reasons for this is that Turkey’s threat perceptions in its near-abroad have shifted due in part to American unilateralism. US interventions in Iraq, Syria and Iran all of which are Turkey’s neighbours — have been most influential in this regard.
Washington’s lack of regard for Turkish security interests, particularly following the fall of the USSR, has progressively moved Ankara away from Washington. The Syrian Civil War highlighted those discrepancies between the NATO allies, while more recently, US backing for an autonomous, Kurdish-dominated entity in Syria that Turkey perceives as a critical national security concern has only further damaged relations. From Turkey’s perspective, Trump’s threat to “devastate’’ the Turkish economy if Turkey were to intervene against the Kurds was aclear indication to Ankara that the United States may sacrifice Turkey for a non-state actor.
In this context, Erdogan will meet with Biden in his presidential role at a time when relations are at a low point. But there are rumours swirling of a possible deal in the making. Reports suggest that an agreement between the US and Turkey could see Ankara operate and protect Afghanistan's Kabul airport, “assuring that coalition embassies in Afghanistan remain safe,” following the withdrawal of US troops.
Read more about this story here.
US and UK Reaffirm ‘Special Relationship' with Atlantic Charter
Before the G7 summit got underway today, Joe Biden and Boris Johnson agreed to sign a new Atlantic Charter between the United States and the United Kingdom. The charter is a direct reference to a previous Atlantic Charter signed in 1941 between Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt which outlined the kind of international order would be built once the war was won.
In many ways, we still live in the residue of that original charter conceived at the height of the Second World War, one centred on individual rights, and free trade, and democratic sovereignty. The new charter signed this week speaks in support of similar interests, such as "defending democracy, reaffirming the importance of collective security, and building a fair and sustainable global trading system."
But political writer Tom Rogan notes that each leader is seeking different things from the declaration. For Biden, this charter is about bringing Britain on board to the US-led liberal international order, with the intention of ascertaining Britain's support for America's effort to constrain China.
Whereas for Johnson, the priority is to ensure an image of Britain’s prestigious global position is maintained to his domestic and international audiences. Biden is no natural friend to the Tory government, if only because of his views on political tensions in Ireland. But Britain cannot afford to agitate its closest and most important ally right now, particularly at a time of transition following the country’s exit from the European Union.
Read more about this story here.