In Geopolitics Today: Monday, January 6th
Great Powers Vie for Syria's Energy Infrastructure After Assad, Moldova Forced to Seek New Gas Sources, and other stories.
Great Powers Vie for Syria's Energy Infrastructure After Assad
Assad's removal in December 2024 has reopened competition for Syria's energy infrastructure and resources. Prior to 2011, Syria produced 400,000 barrels per day from 2.5 billion barrel reserves, with European refineries specifically configured for its heavy sour and lighter grades. The country also holds 8.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves.
Russia has moved to maintain its position by engaging the new Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leadership, protecting both its Mediterranean naval base at Tartus and its 2017 energy agreements covering 40 projects. The United States has long opposed Russia's presence in Syria, viewing it as a threat to Israeli security and US regional interests. Three competing visions have emerged: a US-backed plan to route Qatari gas through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Turkey; Russia's preferred Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline; and China's incorporation of Syria into its Belt and Road network through the $17 billion Strategic Development Road. Turkey has separately begun exploring Syria's oil and gas development. The technical and financial requirements for rebuilding Syria's damaged energy sector will determine which proposal succeeds.
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Kazakhstan Navigates Diplomatic Crisis in Air Crash Investigation
A Russian-caused airliner crash in Kazakhstan has created a tense diplomatic situation involving three regional powers. On December 25, Russian air defences shot down an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft that subsequently crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 of 67 people aboard. Kazakhstan finds itself in a precarious position as it leads the crash investigation. The decision to send the black boxes to Brazil for analysis, rather than Russia, signals Kazakhstan's attempt to ensure an independent investigation despite likely Russian displeasure.
The stakes are high for Kazakhstan's balancing act between these neighbours. Russia controls crucial oil export infrastructure through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which handles 80% of Kazakhstan's Tengiz field exports and could be disrupted as leverage. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is an increasingly important partner for Kazakhstan in developing East-West trade routes and renewable energy exports. This explains President Tokayev's cautious diplomacy, including separate calls with both Putin and Aliyev while avoiding public statements about crash causes. The investigation's preliminary findings, expected in late January, will test Kazakhstan's ability to maintain this delicate equilibrium.
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Middle East Develops Space Infrastructure
The Middle East has developed significant missile and space capabilities. Iran has successfully integrated these technologies, using converted missile systems like the Safir and Zoljanah to launch satellites while constructing the new Chabahar Spaceport. Israel operates the Arrow-3 missile defence system, launches satellites via its Shavit vehicles, and maintains the Ofeq reconnaissance satellite network. Gulf states are pursuing different approaches: the UAE has reached Mars and plans domestic satellite manufacturing, Saudi Arabia is expanding its satellite program and space agency, and Oman is developing the Etlaq Spaceport to offer launch services.
The region's space activities increasingly serve multiple functions. High-resolution Earth observation satellites provide environmental monitoring and agricultural data, while enabling military reconnaissance. Navigation and communication satellites support both civilian infrastructure and military operations. As these space capabilities grow more essential to national infrastructure, Middle Eastern states must consider how to protect their satellites — potentially by developing counter-space capabilities using existing missile technology. This has led several countries to invest in both defensive measures and surveillance systems to monitor space activities.
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Moldova Forced to Seek New Gas Sources
On January 1, 2025, Russian gas supplies to Moldova ceased after Ukraine's refusal to renegotiate its gas transit agreement with Russia. Gazprom declined to supply Moldova through alternative routes like TurkStream, citing disputed debts that Gazprom claims total $709 million. Moldova's government has implemented rationing measures reducing energy consumption by a third, while securing 62% of its reduced demand through imports from Romania and Ukraine. The Cuciurgan power station in Transnistria, which previously generated up to 80% of Moldova's electricity using Russian gas, has switched to coal and fuel oil with reserves projected to last 50 days.
The timing and nature of this supply disruption suggests broader strategic calculations beyond commercial disputes. With Moldova's parliamentary elections scheduled for mid-2025, Russia appears to be leveraging energy dependence to influence domestic politics. However, this strategy carries risks, potentially accelerating Moldova's energy diversification efforts through alternatives like Romania or LNG terminals in Greece, Poland, and Lithuania. The response from Western powers, including Ukraine's decision to export electricity despite its own shortages, indicates a coordinated commitment to maintaining Moldova's pro-European trajectory.
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China-India Investment Gap Widens in Central Asia
China and India both seek strong economic ties with Central Asia's five states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) to access energy resources and markets, but their success differs markedly. China has established a dominant economic presence through massive infrastructure investments and trade growth, while India's engagement remains limited despite policy initiatives.
Chinese investment in Central Asia exceeded $2 billion in 2023, making it a top foreign investor alongside Western countries and Russia. Trade has more than doubled from $41 billion in 2018 to $90 billion in 2023. Major projects include the Khorgos Gateway container terminal in Kazakhstan, multiple oil and gas pipelines, and railway links — all part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By contrast, India's investments hover around $30 million annually and bilateral trade barely reached $1 billion in 2023, despite initiatives like the Chabahar port project and joining the Ashgabat Agreement. Three key factors explain this disparity: China's vastly greater financial resources and state enterprise network, its direct geographic access to Central Asia versus India's need to route through Pakistan or Iran, and India's strategic concerns about participating in Chinese-led BRI projects.
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China and Vietnam Launch Joint Strategic Dialogue
China and Vietnam have established a new “3+3 strategic dialogue” focused on defence, diplomacy and public security, even as tensions persist over South China Sea territorial disputes. The dialogue occurs against a backdrop of continued Chinese pressure on Vietnamese fishing vessels.
Despite such incidents, Vietnam has quietly strengthened its position, expanding land reclamation in the Spratly Islands by 2,360 acres as of May 2024. This expansion has not triggered major Chinese retaliation, likely because Vietnam's actions are viewed separately from US-China competition, unlike recent Philippines-China clashes over contested features. The new dialogue reflects Vietnam's pragmatic “bamboo diplomacy” — balancing relations between China and other powers through its “Four No's” policy of non-alignment. While China seeks to prevent South China Sea disputes from escalating and limit US involvement, Vietnam aims to maintain strategic autonomy while managing tensions with its larger neighbour.