Turkish Ambitions in the Mediterranean Sea

A New Doctrine to Satisfy Growing Energy Needs

As 2019 was closing, Turkey signed an agreement with Libya which raised quite a few eyebrows across the Mediterranean. Signed by the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC) and Turkish officials, the agreement allows Turkish forces access to Libya's coastal territory and establishes a de facto maritime border between the two nations in the eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara says the deal grants it exclusive drilling rights in a significant chunk of the eastern Mediterranean. Control of the marked maritime territory (see below) would indeed enable Turkey to control and influence the movement of vessels, the utilization of natural oil and gas reservoirs, as well as impede the stated goals of other regional players as is the case with the construction of a pipeline from Israel to Italy.

The maritime border agreed upon between Turkey and the TNC (Marked E to F).
Source: Anadolu Agency, available here.

Unsurprisingly, the agreement caused immense dissatisfaction among key Mediterranean players. Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, as well as France, all have issued statements condemning the unilateral deal between Turkey and the NTC. Both Greece and Cyprus have led the bulk of the resistance to the deal with support of the EU. Their criticism of Turkey contends that the agreement has no basis in maritime law, and that it directly infringes on their own rights under international law.

Then, in February 2020, Libya’s National Army (LNA) announced it bombed a Turkish merchant ship in the port of Tripoli. Turkey, along with the UN, are in support of the TNC, and the ship carried onboard munitions destined for the port city. The Mediterranean is a muddy battleground at the moment.

More recently, Egypt has positioned a considerable force at its border with Libya and has threatened regional actors in support of the TNC that it is willing to intervene in the conflict to safeguard its interests. And just a few weeks ago, France traded barbs with Turkey as a French warship tried to inspect a [Turkish] vessel that it suspected was violating a UN arms embargo on Libya.

It is evident from these episodes and many others that the eastern Mediterranean is undergoing dramatic change as Turkey acts with increasing confidence. A broad strategic overview of the events in which Turkey is involved in might shed some light on its strategic goals and its bid to become a regional maritime power.

Turkey’s actions in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, together with its ongoing operations in Syria, the Red Sea, and other places in the Greater Middle East, are a part of a broad strategic plan. Erdoğan's government has set out on a policy which seeks to provide Turkey with maritime control in its surrounding seas, thereby enhancing its strategic position in the region and opening avenues of resource exploitation for Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean moving forward. The plan will boost Turkey’s economic growth and open the door to its energy independence.

The Blue Homeland Doctrine

The Turkish naval plan, announced by Admiral Cem Gurdeniz in 2006, is called “The Blue Homeland Doctrine” (Mavi Vatan). It stands on firm ground, as the admiral spearheading this doctrine served in the Turkish Navy, and carries with him extensive operational and command experience.

The Blue Homeland doctrine’s goal, which was announced with the auspices of the ruling government, is to achieve Turkish control and consolidation of the three seas surrounding it, and in doing so, to increase Turkey's regional influence and secure critical energy resources. If successful, Turkey will greatly boost its economic growth potential, be better positioned to support its rapid demographic growth, and reduce its energy dependence on outside powers.

Beyond the Blue Homeland doctrine’s stated goals, and looking more broadly, a view emanating from Ankara is one which seeks to undo some elements of the treaty of Lausanne, which in this government's view was forced upon the Turks unfavorably in 1923.

This treaty, which came after the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, severely restricted the new Turkish state in its freedom to act unilaterally in the region. For over a hundred years since the signing of that treaty, Turkey has enjoyed western support. Much of the 20th century saw Turkey involved in a collective security organization as part of NATO, with its sovereignty and legitimacy secured as a bulwark against the communist threat. But that environment is changing, as evidenced by recent disagreements between Turkey and the US regarding the purchase of the Russian S-400 system, and further still by Turkeys fictitious relationship with the EU. The disunity present between Turkey and these longstanding partners has complicated meaningful security cooperation.

Its increasing independence from its tradition allies has also been made possible with Russia’s weakening following the fall of the Communist bloc and a period of rapid economic and demographic growth in Turkey since that time, providing the opportunity to establish itself in the region. Turkish demography has seen a healthy rise to the 82 million citizens of today, and is projected to increase further still up to 90 million by the year 2030. With this demographic potential comes the need for energy, as such Turkey’s energy needs have risen and energy is a key driver of growth for the Turkey’s economy. The bulk of the Turkish economy today is based on a local market economy with a significant reliance on foreign investment. But it is its energy sector which troubles Turkish policymakers the most.

Roughly a quarter of all Turkish energy needs are sourced domestically. This means Turkey’s energy needs are for the most part met via imports, causing a dependence on foreign suppliers. International instability abroad could spell trouble at home for Turkey, and this is particularly prescient when considering the sources of Turkish energy imports as Turkey’s primary energy suppliers are Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. This dependence on other powers for its energy needs (especially ones under international sanctions regimes) puts Turkey in a precarious international position, one which inclines Ankara to assume a combative and engaged regional role. This is best illustrated by the many regional conflicts the Turkish military has been, and continues to be, involved in throughout the Middle East. Whether in Syria, Iraq, Libya, or even the Horn of Africa, Turkey is involved to ensure a continuation of these energy supplies as it seeks to meet the energy needs of its growing populace.

While at the same time, Turkey must maintain ties with its energy partners. A breakdown in these relationships could spell trouble at home, therefore Turkey has a political commitment to these countries (Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Libya), even if maintaining that commitment would have come with associated costs. The fighting in northern Syria, for example, elucidates this tug-of-war in relations between Russia and Turkey. The tension and the delicate coordination of forces between both powers illustrate Turkey’s continued commitment to Russia, even if doing so goes against its current political, military, or economic interests. Therefore, the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and Turkey in the region is rather low.

Turkish policymakers understand this all too well, and the political will to remedy this reality brought about the formulation of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine. Its primary goals are to secure energy supplies and exclusive drilling rights in its adjacent seas, thereby supporting its flourishing population with energy and the freedom to utilize it. The geographic scope of the doctrine seeks to achieve this across two distinct regions: the near abroad and the wider region. The first involves establishing control in Turkey's peripheral seas - the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. The second is a broader strategic designation, which includes the Arabian Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

The success of the doctrine would be achieved with Turkish dominance in these areas, particularly over untapped oil and gas reservoirs. A naval buildup would surely precede such Turkish control. Turkey may also seek to diplomatically acquire leases to Turkish bases in other countries in the region. By establishing military pacts, base and port leases Turkey would be better positioned to press its claims under the banner of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine. And Ankara has begun to do just that, establishing a network of bases in Somalia, Sudan, Libya, and Qatar. Deals with these governments include the training of personnel, the supply of weapons and ammunition, as well as naval basing rights and other forms of mutual military support. Reports of mobilized Turkish mercenaries from across the Middle East to Libya also emphasize the active role it has, and continues to play in the Greater Middle East region.

Whatever the proclamations of the Turkish government might be regarding the "Blue Homeland" doctrine, it must be backed by force if Turkey is to achieve its stated goals. While Ankara continues to be an active player in the region, its goals have left many of its neighbors gravely concerned. A naval buildup would surely demonstrate the Turkish government's commitment to achieve the aims of the doctrine, while at the same time cause its neighbors to balance against it fearing its growing might. As such, a closer look at Turkish military buildup aimed at achieving these goals would be a worthwhile effort, but it will have to wait for another time.