In Geopolitics This Week
The European Union’s Search for Alternative Sources of Energy, Russia Intensifies Offensive Operations in Eastern Ukraine, Chile’s Shift Toward a Maritime Power in the Pacific, and other stories.
The European Union’s Search for Alternative Sources of Energy
In the ongoing search for alternatives to Russian energy supplies, the EU has sought to negotiate with non-Russian energy producers in order to fulfil the natural gas needs of its member states. Even though natural gas prices are soaring, and are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future, EU member states are undertaking a dramatic energy shift in which they are seeking to replace a key supplier in a relatively short span of time.
Thus far, the EU has negotiated with the US to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries, which culminated in a US pledge to provide an additional 15 billion cubic metres of LNG this year. The EU has held discussions with the leadership in Baku, persuading Azerbaijan to maintain energy production at maximum capacity. Moreover, the EU dropped its anti-trust investigation against Qatar to help Germany facilitate a long-term LNG deal. Separately, Italy has announced a new supply deal with Algeria, which should help Italy diversify away from Russian energy as the country buys an estimated 30 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Russia each year. Moreover, Norway’s Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has announced it will increase production at the Troll, Oseberg, and Heidrun gas fields in order to boost energy exports through the summer months.
The sanctions regime imposed by the EU on Russia is already extensive, and the addition of Russian energy to banned sectors could escalate the economic war until all areas of the economic relationship between the EU and Russia have broken down. For Russia, the EU’s determination to reduce energy reliance on Russian fossil fuels, increase LNG imports from the United States, and refusal to pay for Russian natural gas in rubles, could result in Gazprom losing approximately one-third of its gas export volumes to Europe this year alone. Russia’s total natural gas exports to the EU could fall considerably more if the EU meets its stated goals of diversifying away from Russian energy and if Russia cuts supplies over possible disagreements over payments in rubles.
However, there are indications that this extreme scenario will not play out. According to the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Alexander Novak, some of Russia’s energy customers have apparently already agreed to pay for Russian energy in rubles, though he failed to specify which countries those are. Hungary is one EU member state whose leadership has openly stated that it was ready to pay in rubles for Russian gas. In effect, Hungary has broken ranks with most of the EU by stating it was prepared to pay for Russian gas with rubles, and this has damaged the EU’s attempt to present a unified front in dealing with Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.
Russia Intensifies Offensive Operations in Eastern Ukraine
The Russian military restarted offensive operations in Ukraine by concentrating their forces around the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow was starting a new stage of what Russia calls a “special military operation.” Russian forces have now amassed on the Kharkov axis and across southern and eastern Ukraine, with the build-up of forces likely intended for the conduct of major offensive operations on Ukrainian positions. Lavrov stated that the primary objective of this new phase of the war is to capture the Donbas and secure a permanent land bridge to Crimea.
While the Russian Deputy Commander of the Central Military District, Rustam Minnekaev, reiterated that the key Russian objectives lie in eastern and southern Ukraine, the commencement of major Russian operation has yet been announced. Surprisingly, Minnekaev also stated that Russian control of southern Ukraine will enable a future capability allowing Russia to conduct offensive operations toward Transnistria, where he claimed there is evidence of “oppression of the Russian-speaking population.” While not a stated goal of Russia in the war in Ukraine, Minnekaev nonetheless echoes a long-held Russian desire to regain a land corridor to Transnistria. However, an offensive that would connect Russian forces in southern Ukraine with Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria would require the Russian military to control Mykolaiv and Odessa first, both of which have proven difficult to capture thus far.
In eastern Ukraine, Russian forces have made minor gains by capturing areas around Slovyansk and taking control of the town of Lozova. Limited local attacks along the entire line of contact are still conducted, with Russian forces particularly focusing on the towns of Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka in recent days. Russian forces continue to conduct localized attacks while many of its divisions are still repositioning from elsewhere in Ukraine. These units, such as elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army, are gradually flooding in as additional reinforcements instead of reorganizing elsewhere to prepare for a wider offensive seen in the early weeks of the war.
In the south of Ukraine, Russian forces have continued to bombard the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol while besieging the remaining Ukrainian defenders there. Russian forces have reportedly abandoned all direct attacks on the steel plant but continue to shell the facility while Ukrainian forces continue to hold their positions inside the plant. Russian forces appear to be seeking to wait out the remaining defenders without conducting a major assault, with the Russian Ministry of Defense stating that Russian troops are waiting for the Ukrainian forces to “raise white flags” and surrender. Russian forces have also continued to consolidate their control over key buildings across the city of Mariupol and are now likely setting up a temporary occupation government there. At the same time, there are indications that some elements of Russia’s forces are now departing Mariupol and heading to reconnect with units in eastern Ukraine.
More broadly, an influx of weapons and ammunition from NATO countries continues to play a key role in helping Ukrainian forces limit Russian gains on the ground. The United States is facilitating a constant flow of weapons to support Ukraine in the war effort against Russia as US President Joe Biden announced an additional $800 million worth of weapons and ammunition to the armed forces of Ukraine. The new military package includes heavy artillery, over 100,000 rounds of ammunition, and drones. Deliveries such as this are changing the balance of power on the battlefield as the Pentagon estimates Ukraine now has more combat-ready tanks than Russia due to shipments from abroad. This flow of heavy weapons into Ukraine has led Russia to warn that weapons deliveries from the US or other NATO member states are now being considered as “legitimate military targets,” a move that may escalate the conflict if Russian strikes target US military assets.
Chile’s Shift Toward a Maritime Power in the Pacific
The geography of Chile is easily distinguishable from that of other states by its vast but slender landmass which run down the spine of South America. From north to south, Chile extends roughly 4,270 kilometres, yet east to west the country’s borders average a distance of only 177 kilometres. To the south, the country stretches down to the southern tip of the continent — Cape Horn — where it curves slightly eastward. Cape Horn, the strategic southernmost point in South America, is Chilean territory.
Chile's unique geographic shape was determined by its beginnings as a Spanish settlement on the western side of the Andes. This mountain range is a formidable geographic barrier with passes that are covered by heavy snow during the winter months — providing Chile with strategic security. About 80 percent of the land in Chile is made up of mountains, and most Chileans live near or on these mountains. On the other side of the country, the Pacific Ocean lies across the entire western part of Chile, granting the country one of the longest coastlines in the world, and enabling economic opportunities to exploit this vast geographic space for Chilean benefit. Aside from valleys to the north and south where access by land is more palpable, the two great geographic barriers of the Andes and the Pacific Ocean continue to serve as buffers which protect much of the country from potential invasions.
Chile also possesses a wealth of natural resources, including copper, nitrates, timber, arable land, water resources, coal, natural gas and oil. Due to extremes in topography and climate in different parts of this country, Chile’s most developed area is the valley near the country’s capital, Santiago, where the majority of the country's manufacturing industry is based. Chile's central valley is incredibly fertile, and this fertile ground allows for the production of various fruits and vegetables for export worldwide. Some of these products include apples, asparagus, beans, garlic, grapes, onions, peaches and pears, amongst others. In Northern Chile, there is a wealth of minerals which make up the majority of the country’s exports, most notable of which are copper and nitrates. Land in the southern part of the country is typically used for ranching, grazing, while forested areas provide a source of timber.
The foreign policy of Chile revolves around the regional spheres of Latin America and the Pacific. International priorities for Chile in Latin America often involve support for regional development initiatives and engagement on issues related to national security and regional stability. In terms of security, Chile engages with its neighbours to secure its national interests, and is one of the largest purchasers of US weapons in South America as successive governments have cooperated with Washington in matters of defence. However, Chile’s economic interests are increasingly dominated by trade relationships with countries in the Pacific Ocean rather than South America. The country’s international trade with Asia and the Pacific has grown significantly in recent years, with China, Japan and South Korea now serving as the destination for 53.1% of Chile’s exports.
Situated at the periphery of global geopolitics, Chile’s rapid economic growth has transformed the country’s political and economic orientation from one centred around South America, to one which is increasingly engaged with the growing markets of Asia and the Pacific. Chilean territory extends as far west as Polynesia, and the possession of Polynesian islands in the Southeast Pacific allows Chile to more effectively establish trade routes to Asia. While Chile still benefits from close economic and political ties with the economies of South America, Santiago is also improving its reach westward courtesy of the country’s geographic assets on the Pacific Ocean.
As the Pacific Ocean grows in geopolitical significance, increased attention by the major powers will be directed at those states able project power and influence across the vast Ocean. Here, major seafaring powers such as the United States already possess dominant maritime and trade footprints, and others such as India and China are steadily increasing their own as well. Chile is well-positioned to focus on the maritime domain as a means of securing its interests in such an environment. Chile’s security and economic prosperity relative to other South American powers — derived in part from the geographic makeup of the country — allows its leadership to focus on establishing trade links with countries in Asia and the Pacific Ocean without sacrificing other priority areas in South America. In doing so, Chile’s political destiny will continue to be bound by geographic realities, and the country’s growing political and economic ties to Asia and the Pacific Ocean will compel its leaders to increasingly pursue maritime goals.