In Geopolitics Today - Wednesday, May 26th
Russia's interests in the reconstruction of Syria, the US, China and the Northern Triangle, and three phases of Turkish involvement in Libya
Russia’s Interests in the Reconstruction of Syria
As the presidential elections loom in Syria, and as the country remains in the control of various rebel groups supported by outside powers, it is worthwhile to explore what interests drive Russia’s ongoing military intervention as talk of reconstruction of its long-standing ally ramps up.
Russia has helped the Assad regime to not just avoid being overthrown, but also to regain control over much of the territory it had previously lost to its various opponents. Whether Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces will be able to regain control over more or even all Syrian territory remains unclear. The lack of a clear military victory largely stems from the chaotic nature of the conflict at the ground level, with multiple rebel groups each with differing sponsors and goals still entrenched in their positions.
But even if Assad fails to get re-elected on May 26, his opponents do not seem likely either to seriously threaten his regime’s survival or retake territory from it anymore. While this represents somewhat of a success for Russian policy, the situation in and around Syria remains complex for Moscow due to so many other actors pursuing conflicting policy goals there.
Still, the more secure that Russia’s military intervention in Syria is, the less incentive it has to make reforms or concessions to its opponents — including those who have fled Syria. But conversely, the continued presence of Iranian forces as well as the various Shi’a militia means that Assad has other important allies to lean on for resisting any Russian effort to pressure him into undertaking even minimal reform. How so many conflicting interests can come to the same table and agree on a path forward is difficult to predict.
While Moscow has long called for an internal peace settlement in Syria and sees a reconstruction effort as an important element in reaching this outcome, it is neither willing nor able to pay for this effort itself. Russia’s total annual foreign aid budget has been running at just above $1 billion per year, while the U.N. has estimated that Syrian reconstruction will cost as much as $250 billion. Moscow, then, must find partners in financing the reconstruction of Syria, even if that search leads them to deal with adversaries.
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The United States, China, and the Northern Triangle of Central America
The most pressing engagement between the United States and the Northern Triangle countries — Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala — in recent years has centered around migration. As groups of immigrants head north in an attempt to cross into the US in their bid to escape poverty and insecurity, the US seeks to stop the immigrants in their tracks. On occasion, some security assistance or added consular support would be introduced by the US, but on the whole nothing really happens that alters the relationship between the US. and the countries of the Northern Triangle.
The United States has a long-standing interest in maintaining a dominant hand in Central America. The obsession stems primarily from Central America’s geostrategic value to the US. The countries form the western flank of the Caribbean basin and they occupy a place where the North American landmass narrows, greatly reducing the distance between the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Control and influence over this region and its maritime approach remain critical to US maritime border security.
Within this context, Chinese involvement through infrastructure projects or aid programmes would doubtless be perceived as a threat to US security in the same way that Soviet aid and arms sent to the region was always at the forefront of US policymaking calculus during the Cold War. Furthermore, China’s ability to conduct business in legal gray areas allows them to provide lucrative incentives to Northern Triangle countries, allowing the Chinese to wedge themselves in these countries through development and trade.
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The Three Phases of Turkey’s Official Involvement in Libya
Ten years into the conflict that saw Gaddafi toppled as the leader of Libya, the proliferation of arms and fighters have taken their toll on the country. In this chaos, Turkey officially intervened in Libya in January 2020 by helping the Government of National Accord (GNA) repel Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli. In doing so, Turkey facilitated the ceasefire signed in October 2020, which brought an end to 16 months of overt hostilities, and opened the door as the leading power-broker in the country.
Emadeddin Badi, writing for War on the Rocks, traces the history of Turkey’s intervention to explain the motives and future prospects of Turkish policy in Libya. In his view, the Turkish intervention can be categorised according to three distict phases of involvement.
The first phase of Turkish security assistance in Libya was geared towards achieving a specific military objective — repelling Haftar’s offensive. In this initial phase, there was no strategic institutional endgame for Turkey beyond ensuring the survival of the GNA, which would secure Turkey’s maritime agreement along with a range of economic interests.
After Haftar’s offensive was successfully repelled, the second phase of Ankara’s security assistance began. In this phase Ankara sought to secure its military footprint in Libya and establish itself as a power broker. Ankara significantly scaled up the transfer of military equipment to western Libya and established Watiya Air Base on the Tunisian border. It also secured a presence in several military bases in Tripoli’s outskirts, built on its pre-existing military footprint in Misurata, and established a military presence at the port of Khoms.
The third phase involves an attempt to convert this military might into political capital. Ankara is committed to a new political process through the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum as it realizes military escalation would jeopardize its room for diplomatic maneuver and undermine its current rapprochement with Cairo. At the same time, it is seeking financial gains in the form of access to the country’s currently frozen oil revenues, which works as a powerful incentive to local Libyan elites in order to garner support for its policy goals.
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