In Geopolitics This Week
Ukraine’s Constitutional Constraints Limit its Strategic Options, Indonesia to Intensify its Military Modernization Efforts, Russia’s Pivot Toward Southeast Asia Deepens
Ukraine’s Constitutional Constraints Limit its Strategic Options
Ukraine’s focus on accession to NATO is being driven by forces from both inside and outside the country. Domestically, a push toward closer economic and political association with the EU and NATO is the result of both rational political calculations and genuine ideological convictions. Externally, Ukraine’s push for NATO membership has been strongly embraced by the United States since the late 2000s, with US officials and business leaders closely engaging with Ukrainian political and economic elites as part of Washington’s democracy-promotion efforts. But while the reasons for this westward aspiration have largely been political, in recent years they have also become legal.
In February 2019, as Petro Poroshenko’s government was on the way out and two months before Volodymyr Zelensky won the presidency, the Ukrainian parliament constitutionally enshrined Ukraine’s future as belonging to the EU and NATO. The consequences of that decision may be felt for years to come, as any president (or indeed any government official) of Ukraine must now serve as a “guarantor” of the country’s strategic course to “acquire membership in the EU and NATO,” with any attempts by Ukrainian officials to move toward any alternative affiliations for Ukraine now legally enshrined as unconstitutional. Given these legal constraints present for current and future leaders in Kiev, and given the resolute nature of Russia’s resistance to a Ukraine in NATO, leaders in Kiev today face choices that can realistically only be answered with deeper involvement with the EU and NATO.
Even a position of neutrality may not be feasible when leadership is constitutionally constrained and neutrality is increasingly viewed in Kiev as a form of bargaining with Moscow, which has long demanded neutral status for Ukraine. Kiev would be right to remain sceptical of any legal agreement with Russia given the country had already received security assurances from Moscow via the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty. Nevertheless, the fact that all internal debates over Kiev’s security are now constitutionally bound to the EU and NATO could cause severe political dysfunction at a time when Ukraine’s survival as a state is under threat. This reality is all the more concerning given that NATO member states are unlikely to come to the defence of Ukraine.
Indonesia to Intensify its Military Modernization Efforts
The sea is central to Indonesia’s strategic thinking. Its leaders have traditionally regarded the many waterways running through the thousands of islands which form the country’s territory as both a binding force and a link to other regions. Yet, Indonesia has never built a navy powerful enough to adequately defend its vast waterways. Though the Indonesian navy has proven to be capable enough to prevent encroachments by other Southeast Asian neighbours, considerable weaknesses have been revealed in Jakarta’s attempts to curb Chinese incursions into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea.
Given China’s growing economic power and naval capabilities, the Indonesian navy must now adapt to new realities, and Jakarta seems to have summoned the political will and financial resources to intensify this process. Over the last week, Jakarta has made two significant arms deals with France and the United States which, when delivered, will drastically boost the country’s ability to project power over its vast territories and maritime zones. The two deals will see Jakarta buy Rafale fighter jets from France and F-15 fighter jets from the US in what openly signals Indonesia’s ambitious military modernization plans going forward.
Indonesia is taking a more active role in pursuing a pragmatic arms procurement strategy by engaging with a diverse set of arms sellers under the assumption that modernized naval power must be accompanied by a modern air force. Indonesia’s deal with France will see Jakarta acquire 42 French Rafale jet fighters for a total cost of $8.1 billion, with a contract covering the first six of these already signed. A day later, the Biden administration approved a $13.9 billion sale for an unspecified number F-15 fighter aircraft to Indonesia, with the deal aligning with US interests just as much as Indonesia’s as both powers directly benefit from keeping China’s naval power in the Indo-Pacific in check. The Indonesian Navy is also expecting newer and more advanced systems, and the Indonesian government is seeking a massive expansion of its submarine fleet with this in mind by entertaining a variety of possible submarine purchases from France, Russia, and Turkey.
Russia’s Pivot Toward Southeast Asia Deepens
Russia is in the process of a major geoeconomic and geopolitical pivot, through which arrangements in commerce, infrastructure, political and military affiliations are rapidly shifting towards Asia. As part of this historic shift, Russia seeks to spearhead new vectors of trade in Southeast Asia, creating overland and maritime links connecting Vladivostok with Indochina, and deepening political, economic and military ties with Asian partners in the process.
Moscow’s growing ties with Beijing are at the centre of this pivot. During last week’s visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing, the two leaders chose to publicly declare a closely aligned position in international politics. On top of signing major energy deals during the meeting, both Russia and China now appear determined to intensify their cooperation, as both major Eurasian land powers seek to balance against Washington’s dominance.
The commonality of interests that underpins this increased cooperation is multi-faceted. Both Russia and China have chosen to jointly reaffirm “strong mutual support” to protect their respective “core interests, state sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Their joint statement made clear that the goal of this mutual cooperation is to push back against certain “states, military and political alliances, and coalitions” which are seeking to “seriously undermine” global strategic stability. Moscow and Beijing base their position on an interpretation of the international system which emphasizes the central role of the UN in international affairs. This is in contrast to interpretations which underpin policies of the US and its allies, which commonly emphasize a universal ‘liberal rules-based international order’ which often contradicts the supremacy of state sovereignty.
Beyond partnerships aimed at pushing back against Washington’s global influence, Russia’s attempts to diversify relations with Southeast Asian countries have already materialised into strong political and military ties. Russia has been a major supplier of advanced military equipment to the region for decades, sharing especially close military ties with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. But comparing Russian successes here to other regional heavyweights leads to the conclusion that Moscow remains a minor player in anything but arms sales. Russia’s footprint in Southeast Asia remains limited because Moscow does not possess the economic means to play a major role in ASEAN markets. Trade turnover reached a peak of $23 billion in 2014 before falling to $15 billion by 2020, which pales in comparison to China’s $685 billion or South Korea’s $155 billion trade volume with ASEAN that same year.